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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Jurisdiction lies with this Court pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 1989). On March 21, 1989, an order 
(R. 74-75? Addendum A hereto) was entered in the Third Judicial 
District Court of Salt Lake County, the Honorable Scott Daniels 
presiding, denying the Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment made 
by the defendant John P. Pizzello ("Fizze!!©"). The defendant's 
appeal is from the order entered March 21, 1989. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether the trial court was within its discretion 
in denying the defendant's motion to set aside the default 
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. 
2. Whether the trial court was within its discretion 
in concluding that there had been valid service of process on the 
defendant. 
3. Whether the trial court was within its discretion 
in concluding that the defendant had not shown excusable neglect 
in failing to respond to the Amended Complaint in this action. 
4. Whether due process prohibits requiring a showing 
of meritorious defense as a prerequisite to setting aside a 
default judgment, where valid service of process has been 
obtained, and if not, whether the defendant has clearly shown a 
meritorious defense. (For reasons stated in Point IV, infra, the 
plaintiff contends that this issue need not be reached.) 
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DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
Rule 4, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure/ copy attached as 
Addendum B. 
Rule 60f Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, copy attached 
as Addendum C. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the 
Court Below. 
The plaintiffs agree with the defendant's description 
of the nature of the case, the course of proceedings and the 
disposition in the Court below. 
Statement of Facts. 
The plaintiffs submit that the following facts, in 
addition to those stated by the defendant, are relevant and 
material to this appeal: 
1. In addition to attesting as described in 117 of the 
brief of the defendant and in the Affidavit of Service filed with 
the original Summons (R. 36-37 incl. back; Addendum D hereto), 
the plaintiffs' process server, David T. Holland, attested in his 
sworn affidavit filed February 2, 1989 (R. 68-72; Addendum E 
hereto) as follows concerning his service of the defendant: 
(a) As Mr. Holland first approached the door to the 
apartment identified as Pizzello's, the person later served 
parked a vehicle in the apartment complex patrking area and walked 
toward the stairway to Pizzello's apartment. Upon seeing Mr. 
Holland, the same person returned to the parking area and drove 
away in the vehicle in which he had arrived, not returning for 
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approximately one hour, after which he passed through the parking 
area and exited three times within a short span of time before 
returning and parking. (R. 68-72, Addendum E hereto, Uf 6, 7, 8, 
9-) 
(b) After the person had returned yet again, parked 
the vehicle in which he was driving, and gone into the apartment 
identified as Pizzello's, Mr. Holland knocked on the door, 
announced his status as an officer of the court and that he was 
attempting to serve a summons and complaint upon Pizzello. Mr. 
Holland yelled and knocked on the door for approximately ten 
minutes, making a commotion loud enough to disturb the neighbors, 
but received no response. (R. 68-72, Addendum E hereto, HH 12, 
13, 14, 15.) 
(c) After the person inside the apartment had failed 
to respond to Mr. Holland's knocking and yelling, Mr. Holland 
then announced in a loud voice that he was an officer of the 
court, that service of the summons and complaint which he had 
brought had been accomplished, and that Mr. Holland was leaving 
copies thereof outside the apartment door. Mr. Holland left 
copies of the Summons and Amended Complaint in front of the 
apartment door, specifically observing that there were no other 
documents or other paraphernalia in the area. Within less than 
five minutes thereafter, Mr. Holland observed the same person 
whom he had earlier observed entering the apartment, exit from 
the apartment, bend down and pick up something, return to the 
same vehicle in which he had arrived and drive away. (R. 68-72, 
Addendum E hereto, flf 16, 17, 18, 19 [1].) 
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(d) Mr. Holland then waited several minutes and 
returned to the doorway of the apartment at which he had 
previously left copies of the Summons and Amended Complaint, and 
verified that they were no longer there. No other persons had 
passed in front of the apartment doorway in the interim. (R. 68-
72, Addendum E hereto, % 19 [2].) 
(e) Mr. Holland identified, from a photograph, the 
person whom he had served as the defendant Pizzello. (R. 68-72, 
Addendum E hereto, U 22.) 
(f) The person whom Mr. Holland had served had parked 
the vehicle which he was driving in a space correlated by written 
description with Pizzello1s apartment. (R. 68-72, Addendum E 
hereto, fl 10.) 
(g) The vehicle driven by the person whom Mr. Holland 
had served was later identified as registered to Pizzello. (R. 
68-72, Addendum E hereto, % 20.) 
2. Pizzello has placed on the record no sworn 
statement or other evidence that he was not in fact placed in 
possession of copies of the Summons and Amended Complaint in this 
action. 
3. Default judgment in favor of the plaintiffs was 
entered pursuant to hearing on September 20, 1988. In order to 
appear at the hearing, it was necessary that the plaintiffs drive 
to Salt Lake City from Las Vegas, Nevada. (R. 39, 40-41, 51, 
53.) 
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4. In seeking to have the default judgment in the 
plaintiffs1 favor set aside, Pizzello argued that he had not 
responded because "defendant did not feel that he had any 
responsibility with regards to the accident" (R. 45) and that "he 
felt he had no responsibility" (R. 63). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The determination of whether to set aside a 
default judgment is within the broad discretion of the trial 
court, and may be set aside only if an abuse of discretion is 
clearly shown. There is nothing on the record to indicate an 
abuse of discretion by the trial court. 
2. The trial court's conclusion that Pizzello had 
been properly served was based on credible evidence on the 
record, and no contrary evidence was submitted by Pizzello. The 
decision whether or not to believe the plaintiffs' evidence was a 
decision to be made by the trial court rather than the appellate 
courts. The factual findings of the trial court may only be 
disturbed if they are clearly against the weight of the evidence. 
The trial court having found that Pizzello was served, and its 
finding having been based on uncontroverted evidence, its finding 
may not be reversed on appeal. 
3. In the District Court, Pizzello sought to have the 
default judgment against him set aside on a theory of excusable 
neglect. In order to show excusable neglect, a defendant seeking 
relief from a default judgment must show both (i) that he or she 
exercised due diligence, and (ii) that he or she was prevented 
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from appearing by circumstances over which he or she had no 
control. Pizzello's argument that he believed that he did not 
need to respond to the complaint in this action failed to satisfy 
either requirement, is opposed to Utah case authority, and is 
unsupported by any evidence on the record. Therefore, the trial 
court's conclusion that Pizzello had not proven excusable neglect 
was clearly within its broad discretion. 
4. No basis exists for presuming that the District 
Court ever reached the issue of whether or not Pizzello had shown 
a meritorious defense. The meritorious defense issue would only 
have been reached if Pizzello had first persuaded the court of 
his excusable neglect. A ruling by the District Court is to be 
affirmed if there exist any grounds for affirmance, and the 
District Court's ruling should be affirmed on the basis of 
Pizzello's failure to show excusable neglect. Therefore the 
issue of whether Pizzello had shown a meritorious defense, and 
the issue of whether Pizzello could constitutionally have been 
required to make such a showing, need not be reached. 
5. Even if it be assumed arguendo that the District 
Court reached the issue of whether or not Pizzello had shown a 
meritorious defense, and decided that he had not, the District 
Court's ruling should be affirmed. The due process clause, as 
interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, only mandates 
that a meritorious defense may not be required where valid 
service was never obtained. Because valid service was obtained 
in this instance, it would have been proper to require that a 
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meritorious defense be shown before the default judgment could be 
set aside. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S DETERMINATION NOT TO SET 
ASIDE A DEFAULT JUDGMENT MAY NOT BE REVERSED 
ON APPEAL UNLESS AN ABUSE OP DISCRETION HAS 
BEEN CLEARLY SHOWN. THE DEPENDANT HAS SHOWN 
NO ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN THIS CASE. 
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the 
determination of whether to set aside a default judgment is one 
within the broad discretion of the trial court, and a default 
judgment is to be set aside by the appellate courts only when an 
abuse of discretion is clearly shown. Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 
92 (Utah 1986); Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1984); 
Gardiner and Gardiner Builders v. Swapp, 656 P.2d 429 (Utah 
1982); Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 513 
P.2d 429 (1973); Masters v. LeSeuer, 13 Utah 2d 293, 373 P.2d 573 
(1962); Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 260 P.2d 741 (Utah 1953). 
In Katz v. Pierce, supra, the Court said: 
[B]efore we will interfere with the trial 
court's exercise of discretion, abuse of that 
discretion must be clearly shown. Russell v. 
Martell, 681 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1984). That 
some basis may exist to set aside the default 
does not require the conclusion that the 
court abused its discretion in refusing to do 
so when facts and circumstances support the 
refusal. Cf. Wilson v. Miller, 198 Kan. 321, 
424 P.2d 271, 273 (1967). 
Id. at 93, citations in original. In Russell v. Martell, supra, 
cited in the foregoing, the Court said: 
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Broad discretion is accorded the trial 
court in ruling on relief from a judgment; 
and, this Court will reverse that ruling only 
if it is clear the trial court abused its 
discretion* 
Id, at 1194. 
The decision of whether or not to accept Pizzello1s 
arguments was within the sound discretion of the trial court. In 
Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, supra, the Court stated the 
standard of review as follows: 
[T]his court will not reverse the 
determination of the trial court merely 
because the motion could have been granted. 
Id* at 431. The determination made by the District Court was 
within the broad discretion normally given to the District Court 
in this area. Therefore, the District Court's determination 
should be upheld. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION THAT VALID 
SERVICE WAS OBTAINED WAS A FACTUAL 
DETERMINATION, BASED ON CREDIBLE AND 
UNCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE, WHICH IS PROPERLY 
WITHIN THE PROVINCE OP THE TRIAL COURT AND IS 
THEREFORE NOT SUBJECT TO REVERSAL ON APPEAL. 
Rule 4(i) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides: 
Refusal of copy. If the person to be served 
refuses to accept a copy of the process, 
service shall be sufficient if the person 
serving the same shall state the name of the 
process and offer to deliver a copy thereof. 
Pizzello misstates the record in two important respects 
in arguing that service was not valid under the quoted provision. 
Pizzello incorrectly states that "at no time was this individual 
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[the person served] identified as defendant Pizzello" (Brief of 
Appellant, page 21). To the contrary, the affidavit of the 
plaintiffs1 process server, David T. Hoiland, demonstrates his 
identification of Pizzello from a photograph, the fact that the 
motor vehicle driven by the individual served was registered to 
Pizzello, and the correlation between the parking space used by 
the individual served and Pizzello's apartment. (Affidavit of 
David T. Holland, R. 68-72, Addendum E hereto, UK 10, 20, 22.) 
In addition, Pizzello incorrectly states that ,f[t]here 
is nothing in the record to suggest that the defendant Pizzello 
refused to be served" (Brief of Appellant, page 21). To the 
contrary, the affidavit of Mr. Holland shows Pizzello's failure 
to come to the door and accept service of process despite some 
ten minutes of yelling and knocking by Mr. Holland. (Affidavit of 
David T. Holland, R. 68-72, Addendum E hereto, U 14.) Pizzello 
attempts to distinguish between the affirmative verbal refusal 
ruled upon in Wood v. Weenig, 736 P.2d 1053 (Utah App. 1987), and 
his own silence and failure to answer the door. Pizzello cites 
no authority for the proposition that silence or inactivity may 
not constitute a refusal. 
It is undisputed that a person identified as Pizzello 
entered the apartment before Mr. Holland attempted to serve him 
and did not leave the apartment until afterward. (Affidavit of 
David T. Holland, R. 68-72, Addendum E hereto, HH 12, 19.) The 
obvious inference, which the District Court was free to draw, is 
that Pizzello was inside his apartment at the time. The District 
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Court was also free to find a refusal in Pizzello's failure to 
come to the door despite a commotion loud enough to disturb the 
neighbors. (Affidavit of David T. Holland, R. 68-72, Addendum E 
hereto, 1 14.) If the District Court were not free to draw such 
an obvious conclusion, but were only permitted to find a refusal 
when the refusal was verbally stated, then the "degrading game of 
wiles and tricks'1 referred to with disapproval in Wood v. Weenig, 
supra, at 1055, could be carried to new extremes simply by 
maintaining silence. 
Finally, there is no basis in the record to conclude 
that copies of the Summons and Amended Complaint were not in fact 
placed in Pizzello's possession. According to the affidavit of 
Mr. Holland, Pizzello opened the door within a few minutes after 
copies of the Summons and Amended Complaint had been left in 
front of his door (no other documents or objects having been in 
the area), picked up something and studied it, went to his car 
and drove away. Mr. Holland then verified that the copies which 
he had left were no longer on Pizzello's doorstep, although no 
other persons had passed in front of Pizzello's doorway. 
(Affidavit of David T. Holland, R. 68-72, Addendum E hereto, If 
17, 19, 19 [sic].) The obvious inference, which the District 
Court was free to draw and which is not contradicted by any 
evidence placed on the record, is that Pizzello picked up the 
copies of the Summons and Amended Complaint which had been placed 
on his doorstep and took them with him. Service was therefore 
complete under Rule 4(e)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which 
provides for personal service: 
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Upon a natural person of the age of 14 years 
or over, by delivering a copy thereof to him 
personally*.. 
Pizzello filed no affidavit saying that he had not 
received copies of the Summons and Amended Complaint. Indeed, 
Pizzello argued in the District Court that he had not responded 
because "defendant did not feel that he had any responsibility 
with regards to the accident" (R. 45) and that "he felt he had no 
responsibility" (R. 63), theories which he would only have had 
occasion to reflect upon if he had in fact been placed in 
possession of copies of the Summons and Amended Complaint. 
However, Pizzello nonetheless seeks to have this Court rule, as a 
matter of law, that service did not occur. 
The determination of disputed facts is the province of 
the trial court and not the appellate courts. Taylor v. Turner, 
27 Utah 2d 39, 492 P.2d 1343 (1972). The factual findings of the 
trial court may only be disturbed if they are clearly against the 
weight of the evidence. Ute-Cal Land Development v. 
Intermountain Stock Exchange, 628 P.2d 1278 (1981); Farrell v. 
Turner, 25 Utah 2d 351, 482 P.2d 117 (1971). The District Court 
found the uncontroverted affidavit submitted by the plaintiffs 
credible, and drew the obvious inferences therefrom. Therefore, 
the District Court's factual finding that Pizzello had been 
served may not properly be reversed on appeal. 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT1S DETERMINATION THAT THE 
DEFENDANT HAD NOT DEMONSTRATED EXCUSABLE 
NEGLECT WAS PROPERLY WITHIN THE DISCRETION OP 
THE TRIAL COURT AND IS THEREFORE NOT SUBJECT 
TO REVERSAL ON APPEAL. 
Pizzello relies upon Rule 60(b)(1), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which permits the District Court, within its 
discretion, to set aside a default judgment on grounds of 
"mistake, inadvertance, surprise, or excusable neglect". 
Pizzello argued before the District Court that "defendant did not 
feel that he had any responsibility" (R. 45) and that "he felt he 
had no responsibility" (R. 63). Pizzello's argument was very 
similar to that rejected by the Court in Russell v. Martell, 681 
P.2d 1193 (Utah 1984). In Russell, one of the defendants, Mills, 
had failed to answer the complaint because he "felt no legal 
obligation to [the plaintiff] and did not feel motivated by the 
lawsuit to address [the plaintiff's] claims." Id. at 1194. In 
affirming the District Court's refusal to set aside the default 
judgment entered against Mills, the Utah Supreme Court said: 
[H]is undenied statements that he felt no 
legal obligation to respond to the 
plaintiffs' claims support the trial court's 
denial of his motion. 
Id. at 1195, emphasis added. 
In effect, Pizzello argues that the District Court 
should have believed his theory that his neglect in failing to 
respond in this matter was excusable because he was merely a 
partner with the driver of the vehicle which collided with the 
plaintiff's vehicle. (Brief of Appellant, page 11.) However, 
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the decision of whether or not to accept Pizzello's theory was 
within the sound discretion of the trial court. Katz v. Pierce, 
732 P.2d 92 (Utah 1986); Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193 (Utah 
1984); Gardiner and Gardiner Builders v. Swapp, 656 P.2d 429 
(Utah 1982); Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 
513 P.2d 429 (1973); Masters v. LeSeuer, 13 Utah 2d 293, 373 P.2d 
573 (1962); Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 260 P.2d 741 (Utah 1953). 
In order to demonstrate that his or her neglect was 
excusable, a defendant seeking to have a default set aside must 
make two separate showings. As stated by the Utah Supreme Court 
in Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, supra: 
The movant must show that he has used due 
diligence and that he was prevented from 
appearing by circumstances over which he had 
no control. 
Id. at 431, emphasis changed. Pizzello has not stated any facts 
that indicate any diligence, or any efforts whatsoever, in 
attempting to determine the correctness or incorrectness of his 
belief that he was not required to respond. Moreover, he has 
cited no "circumstances over which he had no control" which might 
have prevented him from answering the Amended Complaint. 
In addition, the District Court was free to consider 
the hardship and prejudice to the plaintiffs which would have 
resulted from setting aside the default judgment in their favor. 
Katz v. Pierce, supra; Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, 
supra; Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., supra. The plaintiffs had gone 
to considerable time and expense in driving to Salt Lake City for 
the hearing on the default judgment which took place on September 
20, 1988. 
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In Airkero Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, supra, the 
Court said the following with respect to the Distict Court's 
broad discretion in ruling on the defendant's claim of excusable 
neglect: 
[T]his court will not reverse the 
determination of the trial court merely 
because the motion could have been granted. 
Id. at 431. In the present case, the determination made by the 
District Court was clearly well within its broad discretion. 
POINT IV 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE RAISED BY THE 
DEFENDANT NEED NOT BE REACHED, BECAUSE THERE 
IS NO INDICATION THAT THE DISTRICT COURT 
REACHED THE ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT A 
MERITORIOUS DEFENSE HAD BEEN SHOWN, AND 
BECAUSE THERE ARE SEPARATE GROUNDS FOR 
AFFIRMANCE. 
In an apparent concession that he has not shown a 
meritorious defense, Pizzello argues that the District Court's 
ruling was a denial of due process because it allegedly was based 
on a requirement that Pizzello show a meritorious defense before 
the default judgment could be set aside. Pizzello makes his 
constitutional argument for the first time on appeal, after 
having argued in the District Court that his defense was in fact 
meritorious. An issue raised for the first time on appeal, which 
was not raised before the trial court, should not be considered 
on appeal. Heath v. Mower, 597 P.2d 855 (Utah 1979); Nelson v. 
Newman, 583 P.2d 601 (Utah 1978). 
Pizzello disputes the constitutionality of the 
requirement of a meritorious defense as stated by the Utah 
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Supreme Court in State By and Through Department of Social 
Services v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1983). However/ in 
making his argument Pizzello necessarily glosses over the fact 
that there is nothing in the record to indicate that the District 
Court in the present action did base its ruling on the 
requirement of a meritorious defense. In Musselman# the Utah 
Supreme Court stated the sequence to be followed by the District 
Court: 
[T]he policy in this jurisdiction requir[es] 
that the lower court consider and resolve the 
question of excusable neglect (when the 
motion to vacate the default judgment is 
based on excusable neglect) prior to its 
consideration of the issue of whether a 
meritorious defense exists. 
Id. at 1056f emphasis added. 
In the present case, as in Musselman, the issue of 
whether a meritorious defense existed would only have been 
reached if excusable neglect had already been shown. Although 
Pizzello states that he argued that there was excusable neglect, 
and that he argued that valid service was not made (Brief of 
Appellant, pages 12-13), Pizzello has cited nothing in the record 
to indicate that the District Court was persuaded by either of 
his arguments, and nothing in the record to indicate that the 
District Court even reached the issue of whether or not Pizzello 
had shown a meritorious defense. A ruling by the District Court 
is to be affirmed if there exist any grounds for affirmance. 
Global Recreation, Inc. v. Cedar Hills Development Company, 614 
P.2d 155 (Utah 1980); Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326 (Utah 
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1980); Allphin Realty, Inc. v. Sine, 595 P.2d 860 (Utah 1979); 
Goodsel v. Department of Business Regulation, 523 P.2d 1230 (Utah 
1974). Pizzello's failure to demonstrate that service was 
improper or his neglect excusable (discussed supra, Points I-
III) provides adequate grounds for refusing to set aside the 
District Court's ruling. 
POINT V 
A REQUIRMENT THAT A MERITORIOUS DEFENSE BE 
SHOWN WOULD NOT VIOLATE THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT 
TO DUE PROCESS BECAUSE VALID SERVICE OF THE 
SUMMONS AND AMENDED COMPLAINT HAD BEEN 
OBTAINED. 
As discussed supra (Point IV), the ruling of the 
District Court may be affirmed without reaching the issue of 
whether or not Pizzello demonstrated a meritorious defense. 
However, even if it be assumed arguendo that it is necessary to 
reach the issue of whether or not a meritorious defense existed, 
Pizzello1s constitutional argument must fail. 
Pizzello argues that the requirment of a showing of a 
meritorious defense, as set forth in the opinion of the Utah 
Supreme Court in State By and Through Department of Social 
Services v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1983), discussed 
supra, constitutes an unconstitutional denial of due process. 
Pizzello relies on the opinion of Judge J. Thomas Greene in Gary 
Facio v. The Hon. Maurice Jones and Collection Management Agency, 
Inc., No. 88-C-965G (D. Utah 1989), which in turn is based on 
Peralta v. Heights Medical Center, Inc., 108 S.Ct. 896, 99 
L.Ed.2d 75 (1988). The critical fact in Peralta, which is not 
present in this case, was that: 
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Citation issued, the return showing personal, 
but untimely, service. 
Id. at 897, emphasis added. As the Court further elaborated: 
Here, we assume that the judgment against him 
[Peralta] and the ensuing consequences 
occurred without notice to appellant, notice 
at a meaningful time and in a meaningful 
manner that would have given him an 
opportunity to be heard. 
Id. at 899. It is clear that the Court's holding in Peralta 
arose from the fact that Peralta had never been properly served, 
and therefore never had proper notice. The Court found a 
violation of due process where the Texas courts had required a 
showing of a meritorious defense in addition to a showing of 
improper service. 
In Musselman, by contrast, it was undisputed that 
service had been proper. The defendant's attack on the default 
entered against him was based solely on a theory of excusable 
neglect, and the Court held that if excusable neglect were shown, 
a meritorious defense would need to be shown in addition. 
Musselman and Peralta may be reconciled by stating the rule to be 
that where service is improper or notice has not been given, the 
defendant may not be separately required to show a meritorious 
defense, but where the defendant seeks to have a default set 
aside on the basis of his own excusable neglect, he must also 
demonstrate a meritorious defense. 
The reasons for the distinction are obvious. Where 
service has not occurred a default judgment is required to be set 
aside because the judgment has been entered without jurisdiction, 
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whereas the setting aside of a default judgment on the basis of 
excusable neglect is within the broad discretion of the trial 
court, which has jurisdiction• Moreover, where no service or 
notice was given the error was one which could only have been 
prevented by the plaintiff, but where the defendant's failure to 
respond arose from excusable neglect, the fault, although 
excusable, was that of the defendant and beyond the plaintiff's 
control. 
The present case clearly falls under Musselman and not 
Peralta. The fact of proper service was accepted by the District 
Court (discussed supra, Point II), which apparently believed the 
affidavit of the plaintiffs' process server* Therefore, even if 
the District Court had found Pizzello's neglect to be excusable, 
it could have properly required, in addition, a showing by 
Pizzello that he had a meritorious defense. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court determined, based on the sworn 
affidavit of the plaintiffs' process server, that Pizzello had 
been validly served with the Summons and Amended Complaint. The 
District Court based its factual determination on credible and 
uncontroverted evidence, which showed valid service despite 
Pizzello's deliberate attempts to avoid service. Therefore, the 
District Court's determination should be upheld on appeal. 
Valid service having been obtained, Rule 60(b) places 
the determination of whether or not to set aside a default 
judgment within the broad discretion of the trial court. The 
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defendant having failed to persuade the District Court of his 
theory of excusable neglect, the discretionary ruling of the 
District Court should be affirmed. 
The defendant apparently concedes that a meritorious 
defense was not shown. However, the due process argument which 
he makes instead for the first time on appeal has no application 
to this case. The District Court's ruling may properly be 
affirmed without any determination of whether or not the 
defendant has shown a meritorious defense. Moreover, a 
requirement of a meritorious defense is only prohibited as a 
violation of due process where proper service has not been 
obtained. 
The District Court was within its province in choosing 
to believe the plaintiffs' process server/ particularly because 
his affidavit was uncontroverted. The District Court made its 
determinations based on credible evidence and within its proper 
range of discretion. Accordingly, the plaintiff respectfully 
requests that this Court affirm the District Court's denial of 
the defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2St£ day of 
Qcd^M^ 1989. 
ANDERSON & HOLLAND 
Plaintiffs/Respondents 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this ZJctsj day of 
&£CiH^^ i 1989, four (4) true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Respondent were hand-delivered to: 
Joseph J. Joyce 
STRONG & HANNI 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 841 
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ADDENDUM A 
TfMQ Judicial Dwtnct 
J. KENT HOLLAND, #1520 
ANDERSON & HOLLAND 
623 East First South 
P.O. Box 11643 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0643 
Telephone: (801) 363-9345 
MAR 2 1 1989 
/ SALTLAKE^OUNTY 
By «/ft V *£. ' Dcpiay Cte«* 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GILLESPIE, JERRY 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GEURTS, DALE W. 
Defendant. 
O R D E R 
Civil No. C87-4401 
Judge Scott Daniels 
THE COURT having received Defendant John P. Pizzello's 
Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment, having considered the 
memoranda and Affidavits filed by the parties, having considered 
the pleadings and papers of record, and otherwise being fully 
advised in the premises; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED: 
1. That Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default 
Judgment be denied. 
. ~, AawL. 
DATED this Q\ day of Eebaftrary, 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
Judge Scott Daniels 
Third Circuit Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I the undersigned do hereby certify thcit on the ^ffi^ day of 
February, 1989 I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
ORDER, postage prepaid to the following: 
Joseph J. Joyce 
STRONG & HANNI 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
<U£ 
code:gillordr^ 
ADDENDUM B 
Rule 4 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 4. Process. 
(a) Issuance of summons. The summons may be signed and issued by the 
plaintiff or his attorney. A summons shall be deemed to have issued when 
placed in the hands of a qualified person for the purpose of service. Separate 
summonses may be issued and served. 
(b) Time of issuance and service. If an action is commenced by the filing 
of a complaint, summons must issue thereon within three months from the 
date of such filing. The summons must be served within one year after the 
filing of the complaint or the action will be deemed dismissed, provided that in 
any action brought against two or more defendants in which personal service 
has been obtained upon one of them within the year, the other or others may 
be served or appear at any time before triaL 
(c) Contents of summons* The summons shall contain the name of the 
court, the names or designations of the parties to the action, the county in 
which it is brought, be directed to the defendant, state the time within which 
the defendant is required to answer the complaint in writing, and shall notify 
him that in case of his failure to do so, judgment by default will be rendered 
against him. If the summons be served without a copy of the complaint, or by 
publication, it shall briefly state the sum of money or other relief demanded, 
and in case of publication of summons such summons as published shall con-
tain a description of the subject matter or res involved in the action. Where 
the summons is served without a complaint, it shall note therein that a copy of 
said complaint will be served upon or mailed to defendant within ten days 
after such service or that if the address of defendant is unknown, the com-
plaint will be filed with the clerk of the court within ten days after such 
service. 
(d) By whom served. The summons, and a copy of the complaint, if any, 
may be served: 
(1) Within the state, by the sheriff of the county where the service is 
made, or by his deputy, or by any other person over the age of 21 years, 
and not a party to the action; provided, that this rule shall not abrogate 
the provisions of chapter 28, Laws of Utah, 1945. 
(2) In another state or United States territory by the sheriff of the 
county where the service is made, or by his deputy, or by a United States 
marshal or his deputy. 
(3) In a foreign country, either 
(A) in the manner prescribed by the law of the foreign country; or 
(B) upon an individual, by delivery to him personally, and upon a 
corporation or partnership or association, by delivery to an officer, a 
managing or general agent; or 
(C) by any form of mail, requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed 
and dispatched by the clerk of the court to the party to be served; or 
(D) as directed by order of the court 
Service under (B) or (D) above may be made by any person who is not a 
party and is not less than 21 years of age or who is designated by order of 
the court 
(e) Personal service in state. Personal service within the state shall be as 
follows: 
(1) Upon a natural person of the age of 14 years or over, by delivering a 
copy thereof to him personally, or by leaving such copy at his usual place 
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of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion there residing; or 
by delivering a copy to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to 
receive service of process. 
~ (2) Upon a natural person under the age of 14 years, by delivering a 
copy thereof to such person and also to his father, mother or guardian; or, 
if none can be found within the state, then to any person having the care 
and control of such minor, or with whom he resides, or in whose service he 
is employed. 
(3) Upon a natural person judicially declared to be of unsound mind or 
incapable of conducting his own affairs, by delivering a copy thereof to his 
legal guardian. 
(4) Upon any corporation, not herein otherwise provided for, upon a 
partnership or other unincorporated association which is subject to suit 
under a common name, by delivering a copy thereof to an officer, a man-
aging or general agent, or to any other agent authorized by appointment 
or by law to receive serv&e of process and, if the agent is one authorized 
by statute to receive service and the statute so requires, by also mailing a 
copy to the defendant. If no such officer or agent can be found in the 
county in which the action is brought, then upon any such officer or 
agent, or any clerk, cashier, managing agent, chief clerk, or other agent 
having the management, direction or control of any property of such 
corporation, partnership or other unincorporated association within the 
state. If no such officer or agent can be found in the state, and the defen-
dant has, or advertises or holds itself out as having, an office or place of 
business in this state, or does business in this state, then upon the person 
doing such business or in charge of such office or place of business. 
(5) Upon an incorporated city, by delivering a copy thereof to the 
mayor or recorder; upon an incorporated town, by delivering a copy 
thereof to the president or clerk of the board of trustees. 
(6) Upon a county; by delivering a copy thereof to a county commis-
sioner or to the county clerk of such countyD 
(7) Upon a school district or board of education, by delivering a copy 
thereof to the president or clerk of the board. 
(8) Upon an irrigation or drainage district, by delivering a copy to the 
president or secretary of its board. 
(9) Upon the state of Utah, in such cases as by law are authorized to be 
brought against the state, by delivering a copy thereof to the attorney 
general. 
(10) Upon a natural person, nonresident of the state of Utah, doing 
business in this state at one or more places of business, as set forth in 
Rule 17(e), by delivering a copy thereof to the defendant personally or to 
one of his managers, superintendents or agents. 
(11) Upon a department or agency of this state, or upon any public 
board, commission or body, subject to suit, by delivering a copy thereof to 
any member of its governing board, or to its executive employee or secre-
tary. 
(12) Upon an individual incarcerated or committed at a facility oper-
ated by the State or any of its political subdivisions, by delivering a copy 
to the person who has the care, custody or control of the individual to be 
served, or to that person's designee or to the guardian or conservator of 
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the individual to be served if one has been appointed, who shall, in any 
case, promptly deliver the process to the individual served. 
(f) Other service. 
(1) Service by publication. Where the person upon whom service is 
sought resides outside of the state, or has departed from the state, or 
cannot after due diligence be found within the state, or conceals himself 
to avoid the service of process, or where such party is a corporation hav-
ing no officer or other agent upon whom process can be served within this 
state, or where in an action in rem some or all of the defendants are 
unknown, service of process may be made by publication, as follows: 
The party desiring service of process by publication shall file a motion 
verified by the oath of such party or of someone in his behalf for an order 
of publication. It shall state the facts authorizing such service and shall 
show the efforts that have been made to obtain personal service within 
this state, and shall give the address, or last known address, of each 
person to be served or shall state that the same is unknown. The court 
shall hear the motion ex parte and, if satisfied that due diligence has been 
used to obtain personal service within this state, or that efforts to obtain 
the same would have been of no avail, shall order publication of the 
summons in a newspaper having general circulation in the county in 
which the action is pending. Such publication shall be made at least once 
a week for four successive weeks. Within ten days after the order is 
entered, the clerk shall mail a copy of the summons and complaint to each 
person whose address has been stated in the motion. Service shall be 
complete on the day of the last publication. 
(2) Alternative to service by publication. In circumstances de-
scribed in (1) above justifying service of summons by publication, if the 
party desiring service of summons shall file a verified petition stating the 
facts from which the court determines that service by mail is just as likely 
to give actual notice as service by publication, the court may order that 
service of summons shall be given by the clerk mailing a copy of the 
summons and complaint to the party to be served at his address, or his 
last known address. Service shall be complete ten days after such mail-
ing. 
(3) Service outside of state. Personal service of a copy of the sum-
mons and complaint outside of this state is equivalent to service by publi-
cation and deposit in the post office, and shall be complete on the day of 
such service. 
(g) Manner of proof. Within five days after service of process, proof 
thereof shall be made as follows: 
(1) if served by a sheriff or United States marshal, or a deputy of ei-
ther, by his certificate with a statement as to the date, place, and manner 
of service. 
(2) if by any other person, by his affidavit thereof, with the same state-
ment 
(3) if by publication by the affidavit of the publisher or printer or his 
foreman or principal clerk, showing the same and specifying the date of 
the first and last publication; and an affidavit by the clerk of the court of 
a deposit of a copy of the summons and complaint in the post office as 
prescribed by Subdivision (0 of this rule, if such deposit shall have been 
made. 
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(4) by the written admission or waiver of service by the person to be 
served, duly acknowledged, or otherwise proved.. 
(h) Amendment At any time in its discretion and upon such terms as it 
deems just, the court may allow any process or proof of service thereof to be 
amended, unless it clearly appears that material prejudice would result to the 
substantial rights of the party against whom the process issued. 
Xi) Refusal of copy. If the person to be served refuses to accept a copy of 
the process, service shall be sufficient if the person serving the same shall 
state the name of the process and offer to deliver a copy thereof. 
(j) Time of service to be endorsed on copy. At the time of service, the 
person making such service shall endorse upon the copy of the summons left 
for the person being served, the date upon which the same was served, and 
shall sign his name thereto, and, if an officer, add his official title. 
(k) Designation of newspaper for publication of notice. In any pro-
ceeding, where summons or other notice is required to be published, the court 
shall, upon the request of the party applying for such publication, designate 
the newspaper and authorize and direct that such publication shall be made 
therein; provided, that the newspaper selected shall be a newspaper of general 
circulation in the county where such publication is required to be made and 
shall be published in the English language. 
(1) Service of process by telegraph or telephone. A summons, writ, 
order or other process in any civil action or proceeding, and all other papers 
requiring service, may be transmitted by telegraph or telephone for service in 
any place within this state, and the telegraphic or telephonic copy of such 
process or paper so transmitted may be served or executed by the officer or 
other person to whom it is sent for that purpose, and returned by him, if 
return is required, in the same manner and with the same force and effect as 
the original thereof; and the officer or person serving or executing the same 
has the same authority, and is subject to the same liabilities as if the copy 
were the original The process or paper, when a writ or order, must be filed in 
the court from which it was issued, and a certified copy thereof must be 
preserved in the telegraph or telephone office from which it was sent. The 
operator sending the message may use either the original or a certified copy of 
the process or paper. Whenever any document to be sent by telegraph or 
telephone bears a seal, either private or official, it is not necessary for the 
operator in sending the same to telegraph or telephone a description of the 
seal, or any word or device thereon, but the same may be expressed in the 
telegraphic or telephonic copy by the letters "L-S.," or by the word "Seal.* 
(m) Service by constable* All writs and process, including executions 
upon judgments, issued out of a district, city or justice court in a civil action or 
proceeding may be served by any constable of the county. 
(Amended, effective March 1, 1988.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
ment added Subdivision (e)(12). 
Compiler's Notes. — This rale generally 
follows Rule 4, F.R.C.P. 
Laws 1945, ch. 28, referred to in Subdivision 
(dXD, appears as § 12-1-8, relating to actions 
by collection agencies. 
The reference, in Subdivision (e)(5), to the 
"president or clerk of the board of trustees'* of 
an incorporated town seems incorrect Accord-
ing to §§ 10-2-110 and 10-3-106, the governing 
body of an incorporated town consists of a 
council and mayor. 
Cross-References. — Collection agencies, 
process server in actions by, § 12-1-8. 
Condominium association or ownership, ser-
vice of process on person designated in declara-
tion, § 57-8-33. 
Constable, servnce of process by, §§ 17-22-25, 
17-25-1. 
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Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order, 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other 
parts of the record and errors therein arisiAg from oversight or omission may 
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of 
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pen-
dency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is 
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending 
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evi-
dence; fraud, etc On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may 
in the furtheraxice of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a 
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrin-
sic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; 
(4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally 
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has 
Med to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has 
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is 
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that 
the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time and for reasons U)> (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3 
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A 
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or 
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to enter-
tain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or pro-
ceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for 
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these 
rules or by an independent action. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is patterned to 3* aside judgment, §§ 78-3-16.5, 78-4-24, 
after, and similar to, Hule 60,1.ILC.P. 78-MA; Appx. O, Code of 3uoidai Adimmstra-
Cross-References. — Fee for filing motion tiei** 
ADDENDUM D 
•r\2* "*H { r~" . . . 
. BRONSTON, #44TO' r !^"^ri ' ; :>iy . nJL , Q (fa\, $Jjr 
K HOLLAND „ WHOM tt^vJ JMe^ULJO^^ 
for P l a i n t i f f Hit 13 2 ^ P & J P R V E J I JMtiMd£<lp&J&-First south _ .
 ; _ iy - (iJTMJr 0y 
Sal t Lake C i ty , Uf.&h 841CT2-:^ .V. SERVE0'V3V J^Jkna^f/j^M^^^ 
Telephone: (801) J^V^Ws.^.TY-%\ I'iTA *J A A 
KENNETH A 
ANDERSON &
Attorneys 
623 East ir S
^ TT 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JERRY GILLESPIE dba JERRY'S 
DRYWALL and PAMELA GILLESPIE, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DALE W. GEURTS, JOHN P. 
PIZZELLO, and SPRINKLERS, SOD 
& SUCH, 
Defendants. 
S U M M O N S 
CIVIL NO. C87-4401 
JUDGE SCOTT DANIELS 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT JOHN P. PIZZELLO: 
YOU ARE HEREBY summoned and required to file an Answer 
in writing to the attached Amended Complaint with the Clerk of 
the above-entitled Court, and to serve upon or mail to KENNETH 
A. BRONSTON, Plaintiff's attorney, 623 East First South, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84102, a copy of said Answer, within twenty (20) 
days after service upon you. 
If you fail 
against you for the 
has been filed with 
is hereto annexed and 
DATED this 
so to do, Judgment by Default will be 
relief demanded in said Complaint, 
the Clerk of said Court and a copy of 
herewith served upon you. 
£_ day of April, 1988. 
taken 
which 
which 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
PLEASE SERVE: 
JOHN P. PIZZELLO 
6960 WELL SPRING ROAD 
MIDVALE, UTAH 84047 
sx 
AFFIDAVIT CF SERVICE 
STATE 0? iMU^ 
COUNTY OF UtifalL/ S3 -
fcULKWLJLs. , beinc first dulv svcr 
deposes *nd savs: That he/she ic a citizen cf the United States; 
that he/she.is a resident of the State of 1/^X^ 
County of jhfJ/[^ Y^&MJL^ r ""hat he/she if over the ace 
of 21 years and that he/she is not a party to the action; that 
e* t h 3 #/ d3>? o f /JAAJL , 1931, he/she served 
^ ^ E
 t , a full, tru* and correct 
copy .2 the annexec ^AA^im^ s (^ ....' ~Y 
delivering to, and leaving with said Oj^J P. QftsuJUr , 
the same copies at tf£Q fo/^i^ 
th; c upon the said copy affiant endorsed, the date and place of 
service and signed his/her name• 
u?o r- oA^/P- Ptkru/Jf 
Date: fffj/AtflW 
K~6fTUfo~JL 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN t o b e f o r e - ne t h i s -J I /yf c a v o r 
a 
Nctdry Public ' ' 
COEsission Expires K-'S-^D 
Residing in Salt Lake City, Utah 
Service Fee: 
Mileage//.( : 
Notary Fee : 
Locate Fee : 
TOTAL 
: 5 
! ? 
7^P 
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ADDENDUM E 
J. KENT HOLLAND, #1520 „^\tfM*6U8T 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON, #4470 C^ '.*l['* ^ yyn' 
ANDERSON & HOLLAND 
623 East First South 
P.O. Box 11643 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0643 
Telephone: (801) 363-9345 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTYyfcr 
STATE OF UTAH 
JERRY GILLESPIE dba JERRY'S 
DRYWALL and PAMELA GILLESPIE, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DALE W. GEURTS, JOHN P. 
PIZZELLO, and SPRINKLERS, 
SOD & SUCH, 
Defendants. 
A F F I D A V I T 
Civil No. C87-4401 
Judge Scott Daniels 
COMES NOW David T. Holland, Affiant, and deposes, 
swears, and states under oath as follows: 
1. That Affiant is the individual who served Summons and 
Amended Complaint upon Defendant John P. Pizzello in the above 
captioned matter on April 21, 1988 and subsequently signed before 
a Notary the Affidavit of Service, the reverse side of which 
Affiant wrote a description of the manner of his service upon 
Defendant, John P. Pizzello. 
2. That at the time Affiant made said service upon 
Defendant Pizzello, Affiant was employed full-time as a process 
server. 
3. That Affiant has a particularly clear recollection of 
his service of Summons and Amended Complaint upon Defendant 
Pizzello as fully set forth hereinbelow. 
4. That on April 21, 1988 Affiant drove in his automobile 
to 6960 Wellspring Road, an apartment complex, pursuant to the 
direction of Plaintiffs' Attorney. 
5. Upon Affiant's arrival at the apartment complex, Affiant 
left his car in a parking space and ascended steps to a second 
level and approached apartment number 5X designated by 
Plaintiffs' attorney as that belonging to Defendant Pizzello. 
6. That in the process of attempting to serve Summons and 
Amended Complaint at the door of Defendant Pizzello's apartment, 
he observed an automobile being driven into the apartment complex 
parking area, come to a stop, and a man exit from said automobile 
and start to approach the stairway, 
7. As Defendant approached the stairway he looked up at 
Affiant attempting to serve process, giving Affiant opportunity 
to look directly into Defendant's face. Affiant felt that said 
individual immediately acted in a suspicious manner upon seeing 
Affiant by changing his apparent direction and returning to his 
automobile and driving away. 
8. Immediately thereafter, Affiant returned to his 
automobile, wherein he sat for approximately one hour. 
9. Toward the end of the period during which Affiant 
remained in his automobile, Affiant observed the automobile 
referenced hereinabove return to the apartment complex and 
proceed through the parking areas and then exit and then return 
three times within a brief span of time. 
10. Following the automobile's last course through the 
parking areas of the apartment complex, Affiant observed said 
automobile being parked in a space correlated by written 
description with Defendant Pizzello's apartment. 
11. It was raining at the time of the events described 
herein, and to better observe Defendant Pizzello's progress 
towards his apartment, Affiant exited his automobile to gain a 
better view. 
12. From his vantage point Affiant observed the individual 
who had exited the automobile climb the stairs to the second 
level of the apartment complex and enter apartment number 5X. 
13. Immediately thereafter, Affiant approached the 
apartment which the individual hereinabove referenced entered, 
and attempted to serve Summons and Amended Complaint upon said 
individual by Affiant's announcing Affiant's status as officer of 
the court and that Affiant was offering to serve Summons and 
Amended Complaint upon Defendant Pizzello at that very moment. 
14. That in aid of Affiant's attempt to serve Summons and 
Amended Complaint, Affiant yelled through the door and pounded 
upon it for approximately ten minutes with such vigor that 
several neighboring apartment lights went on and neighbors 
appeared at their doorways questioning the commotion being made. 
15• That throughout his attempt to serve Summons and 
Amended Complaint, no individual made his presence known from 
within the apartment, nor did Affiant hear any sound from within. 
16. That following his futile efforts to place Summons and 
Amended Complaint in the hands of the individual within the 
apartment, Affiant announced again in a loud voice that he was an 
officer of the court, that service of the Summons and Amended 
Complaint had been accomplished and that Affiant was leaving a 
copy of Summons and Amended Complaint outside the apartment door. 
17. Affiant left a copy of the Summons and Amended 
Complaint outside the apartment door and in so doing specifically 
observed that there were no other documents or other 
paraphernalia outside the apartment door. 
18. Thereafter, Affiant returned to his automobile and 
maneuvered it into a position from which he could observe, 
without obstruction, the Defendant's apartment doorway. 
19. Within less than five minutes of Affiant's return to 
his automobile, Affiant observed the same individual whom Affiant 
had earlier observed and described hereinabove, exit from the 
apartment bend down and pick up something and briefly study it. 
Said individual then returned to the same vehicle in which he had 
arrived and drove away. 
19. Affiant waited several minutes and then returned to the 
apartment at which he had attempted service of process and 
discovered that the Summons and Amended Complaint were missing. 
From the time Affiant left process at the doorway until Affiant's 
discovery that process was missing, Affiant was in a position to 
observe, and did so in fact note, that no persons passsed by the 
doorway in question. 
20. Subsequently, Affiant personally made inquiry at the 
Utah State Department of Motor Vehicles wherein he discovered 
that the vehicle driven by the individual who had refused service 
of process as hereinabove described was registered to Defendant 
Pizzello. 
21. That in Affiant's opinion, the individual whose 
movements are described hereinabove, intentionally and 
deliberately refused service of process upon him. 
22. That Affiant has examined a verified copy of 
Defendant's Utah driver's license, including photograph of 
Defendant and is positive that the photograph depicts the 
individual he served process upon on April 21, 1988 as herein set 
forth. 
FURTHER Affiant sayeth naught. 
DAVID T. HOLLAND 
Affiant 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
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COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this =J/-^ day of January, 
1989. 
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